A political economy of aid

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We model how the size of a leader's support coalition and government revenues affect trades between policy concessions and aid. We find that aid benefits donor and recipient leaders, while harming the recipient's, but not the donor's, citizenry. The willingness to grant policy concessions for aid depends on how easily leaders can reimburse supporters for their concession. As coalition size increases, incumbents rely more on public goods to reward supporters, making it difficult to compensate for policy concessions. Small-coalition leaders rely more on private goods to retain office, making it easier for them to grant policy concessions for aid. Empirical tests of bilateral aid transfers by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations between 1960 and 2001 support the predictions that (1) aid is given by wealthy, large-coalition systems; (2) relatively poor, small-coalition systems are most likely to get aid; but, (3) conditional on receiving aid, the amount increases as the recipient's coalition size, wealth, and policy salience increase. Evidence suggests that OECD members have little humanitarian motivation for aid giving.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)309-340
    Number of pages32
    JournalInternational Organization
    Volume63
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 2009

    Fingerprint

    concession
    coalition
    political economy
    leader
    recipient
    OECD
    government revenue
    trade policy
    reward
    Political economy
    Concession
    evidence
    Economic cooperation
    Economic development

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
    • Law

    Cite this

    Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2009). A political economy of aid. International Organization, 63(2), 309-340. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090109

    A political economy of aid. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair.

    In: International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 2, 04.2009, p. 309-340.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, B & Smith, A 2009, 'A political economy of aid', International Organization, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 309-340. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090109
    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Smith, Alastair. / A political economy of aid. In: International Organization. 2009 ; Vol. 63, No. 2. pp. 309-340.
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