A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining

Kalyan Chatierjee, Bhaskar Dutia, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Our focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibrium of strictly super additive games, when the discount factor is sufficiently large; we do, however, consider examples of other games where sub game perfectness alone is employed. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient sub coalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core, as exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 8. This vector converges as f1 to the egalitarian allocation of Dutta and Ray (1989).

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)463-477
    Number of pages15
    JournalReview of Economic Studies
    Volume60
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1993

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    Coalitional bargaining
    Stationary equilibria
    Discount factor
    Discounting
    Transferable utility

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Chatierjee, K., Dutia, B., Ray, D., & Sengupta, K. (1993). A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. Review of Economic Studies, 60(2), 463-477. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067

    A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. / Chatierjee, Kalyan; Dutia, Bhaskar; Ray, Debraj; Sengupta, Kunal.

    In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1993, p. 463-477.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Chatierjee, K, Dutia, B, Ray, D & Sengupta, K 1993, 'A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 463-477. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067
    Chatierjee, Kalyan ; Dutia, Bhaskar ; Ray, Debraj ; Sengupta, Kunal. / A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. In: Review of Economic Studies. 1993 ; Vol. 60, No. 2. pp. 463-477.
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