A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

Steven Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By "close" we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationDiplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations
    PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
    Pages265-282
    Number of pages18
    ISBN (Print)9783540683032
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2007

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    treaty
    compromise
    incentive
    Treaties
    Compromise
    Incentives

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Arts and Humanities(all)

    Cite this

    Brams, S., Kilgour, D. M., & Sanver, M. R. (2007). A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. In Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations (pp. 265-282). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14

    A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. / Brams, Steven; Kilgour, D. Marc; Sanver, M. Remzi.

    Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. p. 265-282.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Brams, S, Kilgour, DM & Sanver, MR 2007, A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. in Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 265-282. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14
    Brams S, Kilgour DM, Sanver MR. A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. In Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 2007. p. 265-282 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14
    Brams, Steven ; Kilgour, D. Marc ; Sanver, M. Remzi. / A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. pp. 265-282
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