A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management

Yezekael Hayel, Tembine Hamidou, Eitan Altman, Rachid El-Azouzi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

We study in this paper a noncooperative game with an infinite number of players that are involved in many local interactions, each involving a randomly selected pair of players. Each player has to choose between an aggressive or a nonaggressive action. The expected lifetime of an individual as well as its expected total fitness during its lifetime (given as the total amount of packets it transmits during the lifetime) depend on the level of aggressiveness (power level) of all actions it takes during its life. The instantaneous reward of each player depends on the level of aggressiveness of his action as well as on that of his opponent. We model this as a Markov Decision Evolutionary Game which is an extension of the evolutionary game paradigm introduced in 1972 by Maynard Smith, and study the structure of equilibrium policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
PublisherBirkhauser
Pages313-335
Number of pages23
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

Publication series

NameAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
Volume11
ISSN (Print)2474-0179
ISSN (Electronic)2474-0187

Fingerprint

Evolutionary Game
Energy Management
Energy management
Lifetime
Non-cooperative Game
Local Interaction
Reward
Fitness
Instantaneous
Choose
Paradigm
Evolutionary game
Model

Keywords

  • Global optimum solution
  • Markov decision process
  • Mobile terminal
  • Pure strategy
  • Time slot

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Hayel, Y., Hamidou, T., Altman, E., & El-Azouzi, R. (2011). A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management. In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (pp. 313-335). (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 11). Birkhauser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_16

A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management. / Hayel, Yezekael; Hamidou, Tembine; Altman, Eitan; El-Azouzi, Rachid.

Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser, 2011. p. 313-335 (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games; Vol. 11).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Hayel, Y, Hamidou, T, Altman, E & El-Azouzi, R 2011, A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management. in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol. 11, Birkhauser, pp. 313-335. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_16
Hayel Y, Hamidou T, Altman E, El-Azouzi R. A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management. In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser. 2011. p. 313-335. (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_16
Hayel, Yezekael ; Hamidou, Tembine ; Altman, Eitan ; El-Azouzi, Rachid. / A markov decision evolutionary game for individual energy management. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Birkhauser, 2011. pp. 313-335 (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games).
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