A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities

Tomasz Michalak, Dorota Marciniak, Marcin Szamotulski, Talal Rahwan, Michael Wooldridge, Peter McBurney, Nicholas R. Jennings

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages125-132
Number of pages8
Volume1
ISBN (Print)9781617387715
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010
Event9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010 - Toronto, ON, Canada
Duration: May 10 2010 → …

Other

Other9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010
CountryCanada
CityToronto, ON
Period5/10/10 → …

Fingerprint

Multi agent systems
Computer science

Keywords

  • Coalition Formation
  • Partition Function Games
  • Shapley Value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Michalak, T., Marciniak, D., Szamotulski, M., Rahwan, T., Wooldridge, M., McBurney, P., & Jennings, N. R. (2010). A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities. In 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010 (Vol. 1, pp. 125-132). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities. / Michalak, Tomasz; Marciniak, Dorota; Szamotulski, Marcin; Rahwan, Talal; Wooldridge, Michael; McBurney, Peter; Jennings, Nicholas R.

9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2010. p. 125-132.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Michalak, T, Marciniak, D, Szamotulski, M, Rahwan, T, Wooldridge, M, McBurney, P & Jennings, NR 2010, A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities. in 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010. vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 125-132, 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010, Toronto, ON, Canada, 5/10/10.
Michalak T, Marciniak D, Szamotulski M, Rahwan T, Wooldridge M, McBurney P et al. A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities. In 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010. Vol. 1. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2010. p. 125-132
Michalak, Tomasz ; Marciniak, Dorota ; Szamotulski, Marcin ; Rahwan, Talal ; Wooldridge, Michael ; McBurney, Peter ; Jennings, Nicholas R. / A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities. 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2010, AAMAS 2010. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2010. pp. 125-132
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