A hybrid stochastic game for secure control of cyber-physical systems

Fei Miao, Quanyan Zhu, Miroslav Pajic, George J. Pappas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we establish a zero-sum, hybrid state stochastic game model for designing defense policies for cyber-physical systems against different types of attacks. With the increasingly integrated properties of cyber-physical systems (CPS) today, security is a challenge for critical infrastructures. Though resilient control and detecting techniques for a specific model of attack have been proposed, to analyze and design detection and defense mechanisms against multiple types of attacks for CPSs requires new system frameworks. Besides security, other requirements such as optimal control cost also need to be considered. The hybrid game model we propose contains physical states that are described by the system dynamics, and a cyber state that represents the detection mode of the system composed by a set of subsystems. A strategy means selecting a subsystem by combining one controller, one estimator and one detector among a finite set of candidate components at each state. Based on the game model, we propose a suboptimal value iteration algorithm for a finite horizon game, and prove that the algorithm results an upper bound for the value of the finite horizon game. A moving-horizon approach is also developed in order to provide a scalable and real-time computation of the switching strategies. Both algorithms aim at obtaining a saddle-point equilibrium policy for balancing the system's security overhead and control cost. The paper illustrates these concepts using numerical examples, and we compare the results with previously system designs that only equipped with one type of controller.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)55-63
Number of pages9
JournalAutomatica
Volume93
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

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Critical infrastructures
Controllers
Security systems
Costs
Dynamical systems
Systems analysis
Detectors
Cyber Physical System

Keywords

  • Saddle-point equilibrium
  • Secure control
  • Stochastic game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

A hybrid stochastic game for secure control of cyber-physical systems. / Miao, Fei; Zhu, Quanyan; Pajic, Miroslav; Pappas, George J.

In: Automatica, Vol. 93, 01.07.2018, p. 55-63.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Miao, Fei ; Zhu, Quanyan ; Pajic, Miroslav ; Pappas, George J. / A hybrid stochastic game for secure control of cyber-physical systems. In: Automatica. 2018 ; Vol. 93. pp. 55-63.
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