A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Joseph Ledoux, Richard Brown

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)E2016-E2025
JournalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Volume114
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 7 2017

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Consciousness
Emotions
Brain
Cognition

Keywords

  • Amygdala
  • Fear
  • Introspection
  • Self
  • Working memory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General

Cite this

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. / Ledoux, Joseph; Brown, Richard.

In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 10, 07.03.2017, p. E2016-E2025.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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