A generic construction for intrusion-resilient public-key encryption

Yevgeniy Dodis, Matt Franklin, Jonathan Katz, Atsuko Miyaji, Moti Yung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In an intrusion-resilient cryptosystcm [10], two entities (a user and a base) jointly evolve a secret decryption key; this provides very strong protection against an active attacker who can break into the user and base repeatedly and even simultaneously. Recently, a construction of an intrusion-resilient public-key encryption scheme based on specific algebraic assumptions has been shown [6]. We generalize this previous work and present a more generic construction for intrusion-resilient public-key encryption from any forward-secure public-key encryption scheme satisfying a certain homomorphic property.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)81-98
Number of pages18
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2964
StatePublished - 2004

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Public Key Encryption
Cryptography
Homomorphic
Generalise

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

A generic construction for intrusion-resilient public-key encryption. / Dodis, Yevgeniy; Franklin, Matt; Katz, Jonathan; Miyaji, Atsuko; Yung, Moti.

In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Vol. 2964, 2004, p. 81-98.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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