A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks

Quanyan Zhu, Carol Fung, Raouf Boutaba, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) work in isolation and may be easily compromised by new threats. An intrusion detection network (IDN) is a collaborative IDS network intended to overcome this weakness by allowing IDS peers to share collective knowledge and experience, hence improve the overall accuracy of intrusion assessment. In this work we design an incentive model based on trust management by using game theory for peers to collaborate truthfully without free-riding in an IDN environment. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under which peers can communicate in an incentive compatible manner. Using duality of the problem, we develop an iterative algorithm that converges geometrically to the equilibrium. Our numerical experiments and discrete event simulation demonstrate the convergence to the Nash equilibrium and the incentives of the resource allocation design.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages384-392
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

Fingerprint

Intrusion detection
Game theory
Discrete event simulation
Resource allocation
Experiments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

Cite this

Zhu, Q., Fung, C., Boutaba, R., & Başar, T. (2009). A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 384-392). [5137424] https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137424

A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks. / Zhu, Quanyan; Fung, Carol; Boutaba, Raouf; Başar, Tamer.

Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 384-392 5137424.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhu, Q, Fung, C, Boutaba, R & Başar, T 2009, A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks. in Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09., 5137424, pp. 384-392, 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/13/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137424
Zhu Q, Fung C, Boutaba R, Başar T. A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 384-392. 5137424 https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137424
Zhu, Quanyan ; Fung, Carol ; Boutaba, Raouf ; Başar, Tamer. / A game-theoretical approach to incentive design in collaborative intrusion detection networks. Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. pp. 384-392
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