A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Debraj Ray

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Abstract

    The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Number of pages344
    ISBN (Electronic)9780191709104
    ISBN (Print)9780199207954
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 1 2007

    Fingerprint

    Coalition formation
    Lobbies
    Alliances
    Game theory
    Customs union
    Cartels
    Oligopoly
    Non-cooperative game theory

    Keywords

    • Agreements
    • Bargaining
    • Blocking
    • Coalition formation
    • Coalition structure
    • Coalitions
    • Cooperative games
    • Efficiency
    • Farsightedness
    • Partition functions

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation. / Ray, Debraj.

    Oxford University Press, 2007. 344 p.

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Ray, Debraj. / A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation. Oxford University Press, 2007. 344 p.
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