A dynamic random access game with energy constraints

Eitan Altaian, Tamer Başar, Ishai Menache, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    We study a dynamic random access game with a finite number of opportunities for transmission and with energy constraints. We provide sufficient conditions for feasible strategies and for existence of Nash-Pareto solutions and show that finding Nash-Pareto policies of the dynamic random access game is equivalent to partitioning the set of time slot opportunities with constraints into a set of terminals. We further derive upper bounds for pure Nash-Pareto policies, and extend the study to non-integer energy constraints and unknown termination time, where Time Division Multiplexing policies can be suboptimal. We show that the dynamic random access game has several strong equilibria (resilient to coalition of any size), and we compute them explicitly. We introduce the (strong) price of anarchy concept to measure the gap between the payoff under strong equilibria and the social optimum.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationFinal Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
    Event2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
    Duration: Jun 23 2009Jun 27 2009

    Other

    Other2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009
    CountryKorea, Republic of
    CitySeoul
    Period6/23/096/27/09

    Fingerprint

    Time division multiplexing

    Keywords

    • Dynamic game
    • Multiple access control
    • Strong equilibria
    • TDM policy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computational Theory and Mathematics
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Computer Science Applications

    Cite this

    Altaian, E., Başar, T., Menache, I., & Hamidou, T. (2009). A dynamic random access game with energy constraints. In Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009 [5291611] https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6280

    A dynamic random access game with energy constraints. / Altaian, Eitan; Başar, Tamer; Menache, Ishai; Hamidou, Tembine.

    Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009. 5291611.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Altaian, E, Başar, T, Menache, I & Hamidou, T 2009, A dynamic random access game with energy constraints. in Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009., 5291611, 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009, Seoul, Korea, Republic of, 6/23/09. https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6280
    Altaian E, Başar T, Menache I, Hamidou T. A dynamic random access game with energy constraints. In Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009. 5291611 https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.WIOPT2009.6280
    Altaian, Eitan ; Başar, Tamer ; Menache, Ishai ; Hamidou, Tembine. / A dynamic random access game with energy constraints. Final Proceedings of the 2009 7th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2009. 2009.
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