A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications

Sintayehu Dehnie, Nasir Memon

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Cooperative wireless communication protocols are designed with the assumption that users always behave in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where users may violate rules of cooperation to reap benefits of cooperation at no cost. Disobeying the rules of cooperation creates a social-dilemma where well-behaved users exhibit uncertainty about intention of other users. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium which indicates the difficulty of maintaining a socially optimal cooperation without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior. In this paper, we formulate interaction of users in cooperative Amplify-and-Forward as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009
    Pages3485-3488
    Number of pages4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2009
    Event2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
    Duration: Apr 19 2009Apr 24 2009

    Other

    Other2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009
    CountryTaiwan, Province of China
    CityTaipei
    Period4/19/094/24/09

    Fingerprint

    Cooperative communication
    Wireless networks
    Network protocols
    Costs
    Uncertainty

    Keywords

    • Ad hoc network
    • Communication system security
    • Cooperative diversity
    • Game theory

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Signal Processing
    • Software
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Dehnie, S., & Memon, N. (2009). A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009 (pp. 3485-3488). [4960376] https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

    A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. / Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir.

    2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. p. 3485-3488 4960376.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Dehnie, S & Memon, N 2009, A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. in 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009., 4960376, pp. 3485-3488, 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China, 4/19/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376
    Dehnie S, Memon N. A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. p. 3485-3488. 4960376 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376
    Dehnie, Sintayehu ; Memon, Nasir. / A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. pp. 3485-3488
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