A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications

Sintayehu Dehnie, Nasir Memon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Cooperative wireless communication protocols are designed with the assumption that users always behave in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where users may violate rules of cooperation to reap benefits of cooperation at no cost. Disobeying the rules of cooperation creates a social-dilemma where well-behaved users exhibit uncertainty about intention of other users. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium which indicates the difficulty of maintaining a socially optimal cooperation without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior. In this paper, we formulate interaction of users in cooperative Amplify-and-Forward as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009
Pages3485-3488
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: Apr 19 2009Apr 24 2009

Other

Other2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009
CountryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period4/19/094/24/09

Fingerprint

Cooperative communication
Wireless networks
Network protocols
Costs
Uncertainty

Keywords

  • Ad hoc network
  • Communication system security
  • Cooperative diversity
  • Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Software
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Dehnie, S., & Memon, N. (2009). A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009 (pp. 3485-3488). [4960376] https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. / Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir.

2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. p. 3485-3488 4960376.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dehnie, S & Memon, N 2009, A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. in 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009., 4960376, pp. 3485-3488, 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China, 4/19/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376
Dehnie S, Memon N. A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. p. 3485-3488. 4960376 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376
Dehnie, Sintayehu ; Memon, Nasir. / A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. pp. 3485-3488
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