A dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure network protection and recovery

Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)125-128
Number of pages4
JournalPerformance Evaluation Review
Volume45
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2017

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Recovery
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
Disasters
Telecommunication networks
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

A dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure network protection and recovery. / Chen, Juntao; Touati, Corinne; Zhu, Quanyan.

In: Performance Evaluation Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 01.09.2017, p. 125-128.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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