A defense of intuitions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)247-262
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume140
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2008

Fingerprint

Intuition
Experimentalism
Philosophy

Keywords

  • Empirical psychology
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Experimentalism
  • Intuitionism
  • Intuitions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

A defense of intuitions. / Liao, S. Matthew.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 140, No. 2, 08.2008, p. 247-262.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Liao, S. Matthew. / A defense of intuitions. In: Philosophical Studies. 2008 ; Vol. 140, No. 2. pp. 247-262.
@article{79fce5ba0d7949889fab4da6fcb0ea79,
title = "A defense of intuitions",
abstract = "Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.",
keywords = "Empirical psychology, Experimental philosophy, Experimentalism, Intuitionism, Intuitions",
author = "Liao, {S. Matthew}",
year = "2008",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "140",
pages = "247--262",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A defense of intuitions

AU - Liao, S. Matthew

PY - 2008/8

Y1 - 2008/8

N2 - Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

AB - Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

KW - Empirical psychology

KW - Experimental philosophy

KW - Experimentalism

KW - Intuitionism

KW - Intuitions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=46349102742&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=46349102742&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x

DO - 10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x

M3 - Article

VL - 140

SP - 247

EP - 262

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 2

ER -