Abstract
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
| Pages | 403-410 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2009 |
| Event | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 13 2009 → May 15 2009 |
Other
| Other | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
|---|---|
| Country | Turkey |
| City | Istanbul |
| Period | 5/13/09 → 5/15/09 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Cite this
A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. / Zhu, Quanyan; Hamidou, Tembine; Başar, Tamer.
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 403-410 5137426.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
AU - Hamidou, Tembine
AU - Başar, Tamer
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.
AB - In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349993190&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70349993190&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426
DO - 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:70349993190
SN - 9781424441778
SP - 403
EP - 410
BT - Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
ER -