A consistent bargaining set

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta, Rajiv Vohra

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not assess the "credibility" of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified. However, the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed. We formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a "chain" of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor. Various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)93-112
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume49
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1989

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    Bargaining set
    Credibility
    Imputation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Dutta, B., Ray, D., Sengupta, K., & Vohra, R. (1989). A consistent bargaining set. Journal of Economic Theory, 49(1), 93-112. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0

    A consistent bargaining set. / Dutta, Bhaskar; Ray, Debraj; Sengupta, Kunal; Vohra, Rajiv.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1989, p. 93-112.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Dutta, B, Ray, D, Sengupta, K & Vohra, R 1989, 'A consistent bargaining set', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 93-112. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0
    Dutta, Bhaskar ; Ray, Debraj ; Sengupta, Kunal ; Vohra, Rajiv. / A consistent bargaining set. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1989 ; Vol. 49, No. 1. pp. 93-112.
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